Theme 3: ICT - Information and Communication Technologies Secure, dependable and trusted infrastructures by Kindt, Els
  
 
  Project no. ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE 
TrUsted Revocable Biometric IdeNtitiEs  
Grant agreement for: Large-scale integrating project (IP)  
Theme 3:  ICT - Information and Communication Technologies Secure, dependable and trusted 
 infrastructures 
Practical Guidelines for the privacy friendly 
processing of biometric data for identity 
verification 
Due date of deliverable: M30  
Actual submission date: M30  
Publication date:  
Start date of project: 1 February 2008 Duration: 36 months 
Name of lead contractor for this deliverable: K.U.Leuven – ICRI-IBBT – Els Kindt 
Name of reviewers for this deliverable: Ileana Buhan (PRE) 
Abstract: The present document contains practical and comprehensive recommendations as ‘best 
practice’ for the processing of fingerprint (and of biometric data in general) for identity verification in 
identity management systems in the private sector which should enhance the privacy and the data 
protection rights of the data subjects. They are not intended to give a (mere) overview of Directive 
95/46/EC compliance requirements.  
Revision  Final R2.3. 
 Project co-funded by the European Commission within theSeventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) 
Dissemination Level  
PU Public X 
PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services) 
 
RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services) 
 
CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services) 
 
  
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 1 
Table of Contents 
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................ 2 
1. Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 3 
2. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4 
3. Recommendations for Best Practices .................................................................................... 5 
3.1 General introduction into the proposed TURBINE Best Practices ................................... 5 
3.1.1 Objectives and Methodology ........................................................................................ 5 
3.1.2 Comparison with previous initiatives ............................................................................. 6 
3.1.3 Structure ....................................................................................................................... 7 
3.1.4 Scope and nature.......................................................................................................... 9 
3.2 Best Practice N° 1: Biometric data shall in princip le only be used for verification and 
stored locally ............................................................................................................................. 10 
3.3 Best Practices for the design and architecture of a biometric IdM system .................... 12 
3.3.1 Best Practice N° 2:User control over biometric data  by default .................................. 12 
3.3.2 Best Practice N° 3: Multiple identities and pseudon imity ........................................... 13 
3.3.3 Best Practice N° 4: Revocability of biometric ident ities and re-issuance ................... 15 
3.4 Best Practices for the enrolment for a biometric IdM system ......................................... 16 
3.4.1 Best Practice N° 5: Credential and/or identity chec k .................................................. 16 
3.4.2 Best Practice N° 6 : Deletion of the samples and of  the original templates ............... 16 
3.5 Best Practices for the deployment of a biometric IdM system ....................................... 18 
3.5.1 Best Practice N° 7: The use of privacy-enhancing te chnologies ................................ 18 
3.5.2 Best Practice N° 8 : Transparency and additional in formation for the data subjects . 21 
3.5.3 Best Practice N° 9: Specification of fall back proc edures and of the procedure to 
appeal a comparison decision .............................................................................................. 22 
3.6 Additional Best Practice N° 10: On the organization, the security and the certification of 
a biometric IdM system ............................................................................................................. 23 
3.6.1 Organizational and technical security measures shall address the specific risks of 
biometric data processing .................................................................................................... 23 
3.6.2 Certification ................................................................................................................. 25 
4. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 26 
5. Selected Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 27 
6. Annexes ................................................................................................................................... 30 
6.1 Annex 1: Concise overview of general infrastructure requirements to counter 
administration, infrastructure and biometric overtness vulnerabilities as set forth in ISO19092: 
2008 30 
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 2 
Glossary 
 
Abbreviation / acronym / 
term 
Description 
Art. 29 Working Party  Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party 
BWG Biometric Working Group (U.K.) 
CBPL Belgian DPA (‘Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke 
Levenssfeer’) 
CNIL French DPA (‘Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés’) 
Controller 
 
The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other 
body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data (see Art. 2(d) of Directive 
95/46/EC) 
Data subject An identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable  person is 
an  individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity (see Art. 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC) 
Directive 95/46/EC Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
O.J. L 281, 23.11.1995 
DPA  Data Protection Authority   
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor    
ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency 
FRR False rejection rate 
FAR False acceptance rate 
IdM systems   Identity Management systems  
JRC Joint Research Centre   
Processor A natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which processes personal data on behalf of the controller (definition 
Art. 2(e) of Directive 95/46/EC) 
Pseudonym  A pseudonym is an identifier of a data subject other than the data 
subject’s civil identity (see PRIME White paper v.3.0) 
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1. Executive Summary 
The present document aims at formulating practical guidelines for the design, the development and 
the implementation of biometric identity management systems in the private sector. They should 
induce the discussion on the adoption of best practices for the privacy friendly processing of 
biometric data in the private sector, in addition to data protection compliance.  
In the past, there have been initiatives promulgating best practices for biometrics, such as the 
Privacy Best Practices in Deployment of Biometric Systems of 2003 in the BioVision project. These 
proposed best practices however need to be reviewed in the light of the opinions of the Data 
Protection Authorities (DPAs) and the advancements of the biometric techniques. Such privacy-
enhancing techniques have also been designed, developed and tested in TURBINE in relation with 
fingerprint.  
The proposed best practices are based on the opinions of the DPAs and these new techniques as 
tested and implemented in TURBINE. The guidelines do not focus on fingerprint alone but are 
drafted in such way that they are valid for the processing of biometric data in general. The 
recommended practices aim in the first place to counter or to limit as much as possible the most 
serious risks which relate to the special nature of biometric data in general and address the 
functionality, the design and the implementation of biometric identity management systems.  
These guidelines are not intended to give a (mere) overview of Directive 95/46/EC compliance 
requirements, for which we refer to other initiatives, and do not provide or replace a legal 
compliance review.  
These best practices however may contain elements which can be used for recommending best 
available techniques and for the elaboration of a code of conduct of a particular sector for data 
protection compliance when deploying biometric identity management systems.    
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2. Introduction 
‘New technologies evolve today at a frantic rhythm and in a borderless world. Our legal framework 
and our practices need to adapt to these deep transformations, while keeping at the same time a 
high level of data protection’.1  
This deliverable aims at formulating practical guidelines which are useful for the design, the 
development and the implementation of biometric identity management systems. The present 
guidelines aim to protect the rights and privacy interests of the data subject while at the same time 
ensuring for the data controller enhanced security by the use of biometric data of the data subjects. 
The guidelines are primarily based upon the study of the recommendations of various data 
protection authorities in opinions and decisions issued over the last years in relation with the 
processing of biometric data. They also take the privacy-enhancing technical developments in 
relation with the use of biometric technologies into account. Some of these technologies have been 
further researched, tested and implemented in TURBINE.  
The guidelines further rely upon various studies and reports in relation with privacy and security of 
biometric systems of the last five years, including on projects on privacy compliance and 
certification.2 Last, but not least, some experiences and developments with regard to existing (often 
large scale) biometric systems implemented on EU level have inspired the formulation of the 
present guidelines on how biometric systems should (not) be used.  
In this way, the guidelines should reflect the present concerns relating to the use of biometric 
identity systems, hereby combining mere recommendations for data protection compliance with 
suggestions for future directions in the use (and regulation) of biometric systems. It implies that the 
guidelines for best practices may require more than what is presently required under the existing 
legal framework of the Directive 95/46/EC.  
The present guidelines developed in TURBINE have been presented in the research community3 
and discussed with the Advisory Board of TURBINE. They will also be implemented as much as 
possible in the demonstrators of the project.  
It shall be noted at the same time that the suggested best practices do not replace the privacy and 
data protection compliance measures which remain applicable and required according to national 
legislations. Best practices are more a way of self-regulation and do not replace the need of a legal 
review of the implementation of a given system. The present document may contain elements 
which can be used for recommending best available technologies and for the elaboration of a code 
of conduct of a particular sector for data protection compliance when deploying biometric identity 
management systems. It may also inspire the legislator. 
To conclude, we can say that guidelines should as principles be comprehensible for everyone, 
developer, controller or data subject. They are therefore formulated as general recommended 
practices, without containing all details or arguments on which the guidelines are based. This 
document may however presume from the reader some pre-existing knowledge on the functioning 
of biometric system and on the privacy and data protection legal framework.  
                                                     
1
 A. Türk, Declaration for the European personal data protection day, 28 January 2010, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_28_01_10_en.pdf 
2
 Some of the relevant recommendations, reports and publications which were used, may be referenced in this 
document without however being exhaustive. 
3
 See E. Kindt, ‘The use of privacy enhancing technologies for biometric systems analysed from a legal 
perspective’, in M. Bezzi et al. (eds.), Privacy and Identity, IFIP International Federation for Information 
Processing AICT 320, 2010, pp. 134—145. 
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3. Recommendations for Best Practices 
3.1 General introduction into the proposed TURBINE Best 
Practices 
3.1.1 Objectives and Methodology 
The recommended TURBINE Best Practices (‘TURBINE Best Practices’ or ‘Best Practices’) 
address the use of biometric data in the specific context of identity management systems (‘IdM’ 
systems). The aim of the Best Practices is to formulate guidelines to reconciliate as much as 
possible the use of biometric characteristics of individuals in IdM systems with their fundamental 
rights to respect for privacy and data protection. In biometric IdM systems, biometric data are used 
for enhanced authentication of the individuals who attempt to access a system or a designated 
area (security purposes). The biometric data are deployed to verify whether the person who is 
presenting him or herself is enrolled and is actually the person who he or she claims to be.4 The 
scenario’s in which such verification is meaningful, are plenty. Typical examples are physical and 
online access control systems which restrict access to authorized individuals only, for example 
officials of the government, specific personnel members of a company, members of a liberal 
profession (e.g., physicians), citizens intending to access their personal file with the government, 
travellers crossing borders, etc.  
The use of biometric data, however, involves many privacy risks for the data subjects involved.5 For 
this reason, the use of biometric data may not be proportional with the benefits sought by the data 
controller. If the privacy risks however can be mitigated to some extent, this will have a positive 
effect on the evaluation of the proportionality of the use of biometric data in an identity 
management system. The Best Practices in fact suggest methods for the processing of biometric 
data and the use of technologies which exclude or at least mitigate some important privacy risks 
which have been identified. The TURBINE Best Practices do not purport to be a comprehensive set 
of guidelines to be a substitute for law or to summarize the laws that may apply. Other initiatives 
have been taken in this respect, not at least by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the 
EDPS and the national data protection authorities, and by the consultative committee of the Council 
of Europe. They point to the difficulties in the interpretation of the applicable data protection 
legislation and various compliance issues. We refer to these and other initiatives explicitly, and 
have built further on this work.  
The methodology used for establishing these Best Practices was as follows. As already explained, 
previous recommendations and initiatives on the formulation of best practices in relation with 
biometric data processing have been reviewed. Several opinions of data protection authorities in 
relation with the processing of biometric data have been studied.6 It was considered that there was 
no further need to question these authorities7, as their opinion on the use of biometric data has in 
the meantime been set out in various documents issued by them. Legal systems, where (often 
                                                     
4
 Other means for such verification may exist. The use of biometric data, however, offers in addition to what 
some may know or have, a third factor for authentication.  
5
 For a discussion of these privacy risks, we refer, e.g., to Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working 
Document on Biometrics, WP 80, 1 August 2003, 11 p. The opinions of the EDPS on large-scale biometric 
systems, such as VIS and SIS II, also discuss these risks. 
6
 The opinions and advices of data protection authorities which were studied include those of the EDPS and of 
the data protection authorities of Belgium, Canada, France, Greece and the Netherlands. 
7
 This method has, for example, been used during the preparation of the best practices formulated in 2003 in 
the project BioVision, further referenced below. 
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minor) adaptations have been made to regulate biometric systems, were also taken into account. 
The very limited case law on the subject had only limited influence. The drafting of the presently 
suggested Best Practices has last but not least also been inspired by various recent studies and 
reports in relation with the privacy and the security of biometric systems.8   
The proposed TURBINE Best Practices will contain a brief motivation for the suggested guidelines. 
A full analysis of the legal or technical aspects of the use of biometric characteristics, however, is 
not contained in this document. The expected effect will also be described.  
Last, but not least, the notions of ‘privacy’ and of ‘security’ which are repeatedly used in the present 
document, refer to the concepts as generally understood in the context of biometric technologies 
and human rights without pointing to any specific (technical) definitions.  
3.1.2 Comparison with previous initiatives  
The TURBINE Best Practices build further on previously issued recommendations for the 
processing of biometric data9 and will in most cases not contradict these earlier assessments and 
guidelines. For example, the use of biometric data for identification purposes has been mentioned 
already for some time as involving major privacy risks.10 Another illustration is that of the 
recommendation to avoid the central storage of biometric data in most cases. The present Best 
Practices, however, attempt to go one step further and formulate strategies for which the controller 
can choose in order to address various ‘unsolved’ issues relating to biometric data processing (for 
example, in relation to required transparency). The Best Practices hereby formulate practical 
recommendations for the set up and the implementation of a biometric IdM system. As already 
stated, these are mainly based on the recommendations of various data protection authorities in 
their opinions and advices over the last years and which we have collected and analyzed. In 
addition, because of the further development of technical means, the use of privacy-enhancing 
techniques is recommended as well and will also be included in the Best Practices. The 
identification of legal, technological and organisational criteria in the presently suggested practices 
make hence also some suggestions for Best Available Techniques which can contribute to data 
protection regulation.  
The TURBINE Best Practices will hence not just give a new overview on how the legal 
requirements, in particular the requirements resulting from the Directive 95/46/EC, could be 
interpreted and implemented. Such overview has been given by the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party in its Working Document on Biometrics of 1 August 2003. This Working Document is 
still valuable as it has identified therein the risks while suggesting some methods which could 
provide (partial) solutions. A useful discussion on the application of the principles of this Directive 
upon the processing of biometric data and data protection compliance has also been given in 
various other reports, such as in the Privacy Best Practices document of BioVision of 2003 and the 
Progress report of the Council of Europe of 2005.11 In contrast with those previous and highly 
relevant attempts to outline the difficulties in the interpretation and the compliance issues upon the 
processing of biometric data, the present Best Practices clearly aim to advance some very specific 
suggestions as to how biometric data can be deployed in IdM systems in a privacy preserving way.  
                                                     
8
 These reports also include the deliverables of the FIDIS project on various aspects of biometric systems, in 
particular D3.2, D3.6, D3.10, D3.14 and D13.4, which are available at www.fidis.net  
9
 We refer in particular to the best practices formulated in the BioVision project : Albrecht, A., BioVision. 
Privacy Best Practices in Deployment of Biometric Systems, BioVision, 28 August 2003, 49 p.  
10
 See, for example, in 2001, by the International Biometric Group, The BioPrivacy Application Impact 
Framework, 2001, available at http://www.bioprivacy.org/bioprivacy_main.htm  
11
 Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to  
Automatic Processing of Personal Data [CETS No. 108] (T-PD), Progress report on the application of the 
principles of convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 
CM(2005)43, March 2005, 22 p.   
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They will also take recommendations and outcomes of other European projects and reports into 
account, such as, for example, the requirements for identity management set forth in PrimeLife12, 
EuroPrise and the report on ‘Technology-induced challenges in Privacy & Data Protection in 
Europe’ of the ENISA working Group on Privacy & Technology of 2008.13 Special attention has 
been given to the Biometrics Institute Privacy Code of 19 July 2006 as well. This Code has been 
approved by the Australian Privacy Commissioner as best practice for the processing of biometric 
data.14  
The TURBINE Best Practices finally differ with other initiatives on the formulation of codes of 
conduct and best practices in privacy and data processing in general15, as the focus is clearly on 
specific issues with which the controllers and processors have to cope upon the processing of 
biometric data in IdM systems. These Best Practices will hereby not contain a full list of all general 
legal compliance requirements for the processing of biometric data.16 This approach to limit the 
content of Best Practices has been chosen deliberately, in order to allow to have a focused 
discussion on those best practices and principles which are specifically required for the processing 
of biometric data. 
Once these Best Practices would have obtained general approval and acceptance, it is clear that 
they will have to be regularly reviewed and updated. 
3.1.3 Structure  
The Best Practices outlined below are structured along the various phases in the decision to 
implement a biometric IdM system: the specification of the controller’s need (and the definition of 
the purposes), followed by the design, the enrolment and the actual deployment of the system. The 
decisions relating to each of these phases will be taken by the identity provider and/or the service 
provider. In some cases, the identity provider and the service provider may be one and the same 
entity.  
The specification of the needs that a biometric IdM system has to fulfil is probably the most 
important decision. Available technologies or systems should not make that decision. Instead, the 
controller of a biometric IdM system shall clearly define the purposes of the system. At that 
moment, the controller shall also determine the functionality to be used in the system. We herein 
plead for a clear guideline to use the biometric characteristics in the biometric system for 
verification purposes only, as will be set out below.  
For the design and architecture, important decisions will have to be made again. In order to 
minimise privacy and data protection issues, criteria should be adopted. The guidelines below 
                                                     
12
 Prime, Prime White paper, 2008, v.3.0, p. 11, available at https://www.prime-roject.eu/prime_products/white 
paper/PRIME-Whitepaper-V3.pdf. PrimeLife for example stresses data minimisation, the importance of 
pseudonyms, and the use of anonymous credentials and transparency for the data subject.   
13
 ENISA Ad Hoc Working Group on Privacy & Technology, Technology-Induced challenges in Privacy & Data 
Protection in Europe, M. Langheinrich and M. Roussopoulos (eds.), October 2008, 48 p. available at 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_privacy_wg_report.pdf The report stresses for example 
the definition of ‘best available techniques’ for specific technologies and the use of certification.   
14
 Biometrics Institute, Biometrics Institute Privacy Code, 19 July 2006 (‘Biometrics Institute Privacy Code’) , 
available at http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=8  This Code contains 
principles which are substantially the same as those set out in the Privacy Act, and some supplementary 
principles specific for biometric data processing.  
15
 See e.g., EuroPrise. For a comprehensive overview of other initiatives on the formulation of codes of 
conduct and best practices in privacy and data processing in general (sometimes also including ecommerce), 
see Initiative for Initiative on Privacy Standardization in Europe (IPSE), Initiative on Privacy Standardization in 
Europe, Final report, CEN/ISSS, 13 February 2002, pp. 72 – 75, available at 
http://www.cen.eu/CENORM/Sectors/Sectors/ISSS/Activity/ipsefinalreportweb version.pdf  
16
 Such requirements include, for example, the involvement of the employee representative organisations in 
some countries. See and compare, however, with the Biometrics Institute Privacy Code. 
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require that the user has control over the use of his biometric characteristics. This concept is a 
rather complex notion, which has various elements, and includes enhanced transparency which is 
also needed during the deployment of the system. Furthermore, best available technologies at the 
design phase can contribute to strengthen privacy and security. The decision to use techniques for 
the creation and use of multiple identities in combination with pseudonyms based on the same 
biometric characteristics considerably limit the risks of the use of the biometric characteristics as 
unique identifiers and re-use of the personal data. These technologies also allow the revocation in 
case of misuse or theft or in case of termination of the access to the services.  
Biometric systems which attempt to increase security will in most cases involve an enrolment 
phase. Specific guidelines which address this phase are needed as well.  
The operation itself of the biometric system will also require attention. Specific guidelines relate to 
the use of privacy enhancing technologies which make the identities unlinkable and irreversible. 
Anonymous verification procedures are hereby recommended as well. The data subject shall also 
be sufficiently informed of the biometric process. Last, but not least, the controller(s) shall specify a 
fall back and appeal procedure.   
During all these three steps, organization and security measures need to be specified and 
implemented.  
Certification could also contribute to the privacy friendly development of biometric systems. 
Schemes which address each of the suggested Best Practices could be developed and applied. 
We are aware that some of the recommended Best Practices could be mentioned in more than one 
phase of a biometric system. In that case, a choice has been made to discuss the 
recommendations under either Design and Architecture, Enrolment or Deployment, which does not 
exclude however that the recommendations could be discussed as part of another step.   
Finally, it was aimed to present the recommendations in a concise way. This should allow 
stakeholders to keep at all times an overview of the various actions needed. A visual overview of 
the structure and subject of the Best Practices discussed is shown in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the suggested TURBINE Best Practices for a biometric IdM system 
Design and Architecture 
1. User control  
2. Multiple identities en pseudonyms 
3. Revocation and re-issuance  
Enrolment 
1. Credential/Identity check  
2. Deletion of samples and 
original templates 
Organization, Security & Certification 
Deployment 
1. Use of privacy enhancing 
technologies   
2. Transparency and 
additional information  
3. Fall back procedure and 
appeal 
Functionality of the biometric IdM system 
Use of verification mode only 
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3.1.4 Scope and nature 
The present Best Practices are mainly aimed as guidelines for designers and controllers deploying 
biometric IdM systems in the private sector.17 They are fit for many use cases of biometric IdM 
systems. The terms uses are as much as possible in conformity with the biometric vocabulary 
proposed in ISO/IEC JTC SC 37 and have the meaning set forth therein.18 
The Best Practices do not address the use of biometric data to be stored in (large) databases or 
identity management systems used for inter alia a so-called ‘double enrolment check’ or ‘negative 
identification’ (comparison with database(s) in order to check whether a particular person is on the 
list or not). Such IdM systems, which are in most cases operated by government or public 
authorities, require a specific approach and will be legitimated in most cases by specific 
legislation.19 Having said so, it does not mean that some of the methods, practices or technology 
discussed herein could not be recommended for limiting privacy risks in such identification 
systems.20 The architecture and the design of both systems, however, differ, and they should be 
treated distinctly.  
At the same time, these guidelines for IdM systems remain valid for controllers in the public sector, 
where they, for example, would use biometric methods for access control purposes of their 
employees.  
Based on a study of the legal aspects of biometrics in the TURBINE project21 and a general 
understanding of recent privacy-enhancing technological developments, the recommendations for 
best practices for the enhancement of privacy and data protection in the deployment of biometric 
systems for identity management purposes are described below.  
                                                     
17
 While there may be some overlap from time to time between public and the private sector (e.g., when 
private entities perform tasks of public security at border control), the focus is on the intended use of the 
biometric system (for example, securing access to company premises). If the use is not for the execution of a 
specific public interest or for public safety, the use of the biometric system is considered to be in the private 
sector.   
18
 See for one of the latest versions, see ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, Standing Document 2 – Harmonized Biometric 
Vocabulary, version 12, N 3385, New York, ANSI, 16 September 2009, working draft text, 203 p.  
19
 See, for example, legislation relating to the national central storage of the biometric data collected for the 
biometric ePassports.  
20
 Other risks and concerns, however, are attached to the deployment of biometric data for identification 
purposes. Because the biometric data will in such case be stored in data bases, issues as legal basis for 
identification and unauthorized access and risks of re-use, especially for third pillar purposes, will be among 
the concerns that need to be addressed by regulation. Best practices can in our view not be used, because of 
the legal restrictions relating to identification (see below) and relating to the re-use of data (See, in particular, 
Art. 6.1.(b) Directive 95/46/EC 95/46/EC). 
21
 On the legal aspects of biometrics, we refer inter alia to Turbine deliverable 1.1.1 and Turbine deliverable 
1.4.2 and the references therein cited, which contains several arguments for specific guidelines set out in the 
present Best Practices.    
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3.2 Best Practice N° 1: Biometric data shall in pri nciple only 
be used for verification and stored locally 
It is generally accepted that biometric data can be used in two ways: the data can be used to 
compare with specific biometric data previously stored (1:1) to verify whether the person is the 
same or the data can be used in combination of a database of biometric data (1:n) to identify that 
person. The verification functionality based upon the biometric data offers increased and sufficient 
security for the data controller, e.g., an employer, aiming at ensuring that the person, who has been 
previously been registered and enrolled in the system is actually that person and is authorized to 
enter, because of the use of the biometric data. Biometric data allow to tie a person and his or her 
presence to a particular access procedure by requiring the submission of the biometric 
characteristic, such as in combination with the use of a badge or token or of particular documents. 
It is hereby not required that this person is identified based on the biometric data.  
The presently suggested Best Practices are built upon the general underlying recommendation – in 
our view of crucial importance for the protection of the fundamental rights - that biometric data in an 
IdM system for use in the private sector shall as a matter of principle only be used in a verification 
mode. This may seem contradictory in view of the use of biometric data in ‘identity’ management 
system, but it is not. The identification of a given person is in principle not required for enhancing 
the security by the use of unique biometric characteristics in an IdM system. It is for example 
recommended to use ‘anonymous’ verification where possible, whereby the identity or pseudonym 
details associated with the biometric data of the individuals concerned are even not revealed during 
the processing (see below).  
The choice for use of the verification functionality shall be further completed with the clear 
determination of the specific purpose(s) for which the biometric data will be processed. The 
biometric functionality used shall also be made transparent for the data subjects. 
Motivation  
The use of the verification functionality in a00 biometric IdM system permits to enhance the 
security. Identification, which is sometimes regarded as less cumbersome for the data subject (no 
token is required), is for security purposes of an access system in principle not required and 
therefore from a privacy point of view excessive. The security is for most IdM systems guaranteed if 
the (verification) comparison can confirm that the person is enrolled. Only in exceptional cases, and 
upon duly motivation, identification could be required.22 Besides such very specific cases, the use 
of the identification functionality is in general not proportional with the purposes and the interests of 
the identity and service provider controllers of IdM systems. Furthermore, identification implies and 
requires the storage of biometric data in a database. Precisely this database allows to use the 
identification functionality. The storage of the biometric data in a central place which permits 
identification and over which the data subject may have no further control, will for these reasons 
equally be regarded as excessive and not proportional.23 Eliminating the central storage of 
biometric data will also eliminate the use of the identification functionality. The choice as to whether 
the verification over the identification functionality has to be used, however, is more than a 
proportionality issue, whereby interests are balanced. Identification also requires an explicit legal 
basis and the use of the verification functionality is therefore a matter of legality of the processing 
(see below).  
The use of the verification functionality also permits to reduce the error rates. Systematic and 
statistical errors of the measurement and the algorithms increase if the comparison is made in the 
identification mode, whereby the biometric characteristic is to be compared with a database with 
                                                     
22
 See, for example, Eurodac. 
23
 See and compare with the decision of the Court of Justice in Huber v Germany, Case C-524/06, 16 
December 2008, in which the Court criticizes the central storage of particular personal data.  
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the measurements of a (high) number of individuals, because of overlapping and scaling problems 
in the identification mode.24  
Last but not least, as stated above, identification without an explicit legal basis infringes the privacy 
and data protection rights of the data subjects. Many countries have adopted legislations which 
specify when citizens are under an obligation to identify themselves or may be identified. Therefore, 
in many legal systems, identification requires that this is laid down by law (in the broad sense 
including by regulations and by case law).25 The use of the identification functionality and the 
central storage of biometric data is in this case therefore only permitted if there is an appropriate 
legal basis for the central storage and the identification, the controller can invoke a specific 
legitimate interest26 and identification is necessary. This includes in particular that other methods 
which are less infringing on fundamental rights than the use of biometric techniques for 
identification do not exist to attain the same purposes, resulting in the requirement that the 
biometric identification method shall be relevant, and that the biometric identification method shall 
be sufficient (effective). This is for large scale systems still problematic.  
It should also be noted that the use of biometric databases for reviewing whether an individual is 
listed whereby the databases are used as ‘black lists’ excluding individuals from access rights or 
practical services, also requires explicit legal provisions authorizing the use of such lists, the more 
as such lists may imply some form of discrimination.  
Since a legal basis is required, the consent of the data subject may not be sufficient for the central 
storage and the processing of biometric data for identification purposes.27 
The purpose limitation principle, another core principle of data protection legislation, further motives 
the choice of the functionality of verification, in combination with a clear determination of the 
purpose(s) for which the IdM system will be used. 
Effect 
The use of a biometric IdM system in verification mode and the local storage of the biometric data 
will not only enhance the accuracy of the performance of the IdM system, they will also enhance 
data protection compliance as their application will be in accordance with the proportionality 
principle and the legality principle. By using the verification modality of a biometric IdM system, the 
biometric data use is minimized and any risk for the privacy and data protection rights of the data 
subjects will be in better proportion with the security interests of the IdM identity and service 
providers. Data protection and security enhancement are in this way combined. 
While the use of the identification functionality will as a matter of starting point as principle not be 
allowed or at least not be deemed proportional, the use of this functionality with a limited local 
database could in exceptional circumstances be considered. These circumstances would be 
effective privacy guarantees for the data subjects in that (1) the biometric data are securely stored 
in a tamper free hardware which cannot be accessed by the controller or third parties, such as the 
police, (2) the biometric data will never leave this hardware, (3) the data can only be deployed 
when the data subject presents him or herself. In such case, if the identification functionality is used 
anyway, the technology used should have the characteristics to provide the evidence that the data 
stored in a more central way can not be re-used or accessed by third parties. One could say that 
the burden would in that case would be on the technology (and the controller who wants to 
                                                     
24
 See, e.g., L. Müller, ‘Biometric system errors’, in E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity 
management, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 2007, pp. 26-36.  
25
 See, for example, Belgium and the Netherlands. For France, compare with the requirement of a ‘décret’ for 
biometric data processing for the government (Article 27, I, 2° of the Loi n° 78-17 (as modified). 
26
 For example, public safety. Other legitimate interests are enumerated in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Some jurisdictions may require a more detailed specification of the legitimate 
interest.   
27
 Compare also with decisions of the Greek DPA which considers consent not sufficient.  
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implement such technology and system) to prove the privacy-preserving aspects, in particular 
exclusion of re-use and of access, of the alternative way of storage.28 
3.3 Best Practices for the design and architecture of a 
biometric IdM system 
Privacy and data protection issues need to be addressed at the early stage of the design and the 
setting up of the architecture of the system.29 In general, the architecture of an IT system will create 
possibilities for the system but will also restrict its abilities.  
It shall hereby also be noted that discussions about privacy and data protection in the architecture 
and design of a system refer often to a more technical understanding of privacy. Privacy protecting 
concepts in an architecture from a more technical point of view and which are crucial include 
unlinkability, unobservability, anonymity and pseudonymity.30 Control by the data subject is also 
important. To the extent an architecture could guarantee these privacy concepts in an IdM system, 
the privacy of the system will considerably be improved.  
3.3.1 Best Practice N° 2:User control over biometri c data by default 
Privacy and data protection thought of as the right to decide and to control personal information is 
gaining increasing attention and support in various Member States of the Union. Because of the 
privacy risks upon the collection and the use of biometric data, more control by the data subject 
over the use of his or her biometric data is of particular importance.  
The data subject does not obtain more control if he or she is merely informed of the use of his or 
her data, even if the data subject would retain the right to consent or not. The data subject may 
only retain control if he or she has to cooperate for the release and/or the use of the biometric data, 
for example by handing over the identity document, the smartcard or the token on which the 
biometric reference is stored, after which the comparison process can start.  
It is for this reason strongly recommended that the collected biometric data are stored locally on an 
object under the control of the individual. The fact that only the data subject holds the biometric 
data, increases in addition the transparency over the use of the biometric data. 
In exceptional cases, the controller may motive the central storage of the reference biometric data 
which should then only be used for verification purposes.31 In that case, the data subject should 
preferably still be requested to cooperate for the release and use of the reference data, for example 
by providing a user name with secret code or key, upon which condition only the data may be 
released for the comparison process. 
The control by the data subject further requires that he or she remains fully informed each time 
when his or her biometric data are used in a processing. Every use would in principle, in case of 
local storage, become apparent upon the need to request to submit the reference biometric data. 
                                                     
28
 See and compare also on such new developments, especially if match-on-card technology is used, 
European Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF), Final Report, December 2009, p. 183. 
29
 See also Legal-IST, Doc. No 11, Privacy-Identity Management, 4 November 2005.  
30
 See A. Pfitzmann and M. Hansen, Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, 
and Identity Management – A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology (Version v.0.31 Febr. 15, 2008), 
available at http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/literatur/Anon_ Terminology_v0.31.pdf  
31
 For example, because the central storage would be more convenient for the user ànd the biometric 
characteristic provided does not allow the use of the identification functionality (e.g., hand geometry). 
Compare, e.g., with the Unique Authorization n°AU-007  of 27 April 2006 for biometric systems based on hand 
geometry verification for access control, management of time and attendance and of the canteen in the 
workplace in France. 
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Collection and/or use of biometric data without the knowledge of the data subject is not acceptable. 
In addition, other measures are recommended as set out below.   
Control by the data subject, however, is not limited to the physical control over the object on which 
the biometric characteristics are stored. Control also requires that there are tools for the data 
subject to obtain information about the process in which her or his characteristics are used for 
identity verification or authorization (output), and to provide instructions (input). This requires an 
appropriate user interface. 
Motivation 
The concept of user control over personal information is not established in the data protection 
legislation of most countries as such.32 Nevertheless, the local storage of biometric data has been 
suggested for a while by some DPAs.33 Other DPAs and the Article 29 Working Party are following 
this position and advise to store biometric data not centrally.34 This is considered important for the 
future of privacy and data protection rights.35  
However, a local storage requirement is not sufficient and additional guarantees for the processing 
of biometric data locally stored will remain required, for example, that no copies are kept in the 
enrolment database or that the data cannot be used in different contexts than those originally 
intended. This could be done by the transformation of the biometric data, whereby the data are 
linked to particular services for use by the IdM service provider (see below). 
Effect 
The processing of biometric data under the control of the data subject has additional privacy 
enhancing effects. The need for cooperation by the data subject prevents that the biometric data is 
being used or re-used (for other purposes) without the knowledge of the data subject. This is of 
especial importance because many biometric characteristics (including, for example, iris or vein 
patterns) can be captured on a distance or on the move without the knowledge of the data subject. 
Cooperation by the data subject in combination with the local storage of the biometric reference 
data, further limits the risks of attacks on biometric central databases (for example, for identity theft 
purposes) and of unauthorized access to such data bases. 
3.3.2 Best Practice N° 3: Multiple identities and p seudonymity 
Biometric data could be used in an IdM system as unique identifiers. Because unique identifiers 
present privacy risks, for example due to the possibility of linking various (trans)actions, sometimes 
across databases, it is best practice to avoid the use of biometric data as identifier if there is no 
legal basis for the use of biometric data as identifier. It is therefore recommended for a biometric 
IdM system to use multiple identities and identifiers. The use of multiple biometric identities for one 
                                                     
32
 Presently, the data subjects have information, access and correction rights, and the right to object under 
specific conditions. They also have the right to freely refuse consent. 
33
 See for example, the At Face value report published by the Dutch DPA: R. Hes, T. Hooghiemstra and J. 
Borking, At Face Value. On Biometrical Identification and Privacy, Achtergrond Studies en Verkenningen 15, 
The Hague, Registratiekamer, September 1999, p. 52 (‘At Face Value Report’).  
34
 For example, the DPAs of Greece and Belgium. See also the French DPA, the CNIL, which has warned 
since 2000 for the central storage of biometric data, especially fingerprint, and which thereupon developed a 
position on the use of biometric identifiers which shall in principle not be stored centrally but locally. Compare, 
however, with CNIL, Communication de la CNIL relative à la mise en œuvre de dispositifs de reconnaissance 
par empreinte digitale avec stockage dans une base de données, 28 December 2007, 12 p.  
35
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the Working Party on Police and Justice, The Future of 
Privacy. Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal framework for the 
fundamental right to protection of privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168, p. 14 : ‘Biometric identifiers should be 
stored in devices under control of the data subjects (i.e. smart cards) rather than in external data bases’. 
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person will imply that privacy enhancing technologies shall be used to transform the original 
biometric data and to create multiple identities.  
There are several aspects relating to the use of multiple identities. First of all, in order to assure the 
privacy rights of the individuals, the biometric identities shall be made irreversible and unlinkable 
across contexts. This is to be effectuated by technological means, as set out below in Best Practice 
N° 7.  The possibility for a biometric IdM system to create multiple identities will in principle also 
imply the possibility that an identity may be revoked. This Best Practice N° 4  is discussed below. 
Thirdly, the identifiers for each of the multiple identities for the data subjects should preferably be a 
pseudonym. The term ‘pseudonym’ is used in IdM systems in general as a term to explain that not 
the real, ‘civil identity’ name is used, but another name or another identifier. Pseudonyms also allow 
data subjects to choose and to use a different name with each organisation. Pseudonyms allow 
service providers to create accounts for individual users, while they cannot determine the real 
identity of the data subjects.  
The creation and the use of multiple identities and pseudonyms is a building element of user-
controlled or user-centred IdM systems. In a fully user-centric biometric IdM system, there is more 
than one identity provider and service provider, all operating in the user’s interest rather than in 
their own interest. The data subject would be enabled to select one amongst the various identity 
provider (for example, based upon the security and privacy policies and practices of a particular 
provider), while choosing (another) service provider for reasons of the services or goods. 
Furthermore, the data subject would in principle also be able to use his credentials with various 
service providers.36  
Motivation  
The Article 29 Working Party has clearly warned for the privacy and data protection risks of 
identifiers: ‘The use of identifiers, whatever form they take, entails data protection risks. Full 
consideration should be given to all possible alternatives. If user identifiers are indispensable, the 
possibility of allowing the user to refresh the identifier should be considered’. Multiple identities and 
accountability is also a requirement set forth in the Prime White paper for identity management 
systems in general and the OECD report on ‘Personhood’ and Digital Identity.  
Some data protection legislations explicitly refer to the use of pseudonyms. The German Federal 
Data Protection Act, for example, states that use is to be made of the possibilities for aliasing 
[‘Pseudonymisierung’] and rendering persons anonymous, insofar as this is possible and the effort 
involved is reasonable in relation to the desired level of protection’ (stress added). 37 The need for 
the possibility to connect to a network with a pseudonym has been made explicit by the Article 29 
Working Party as well: ‘All possible efforts should be made to allow anonymous or pseudonymous 
use of online authentication systems’.38  
Legislation could give data subjects the right to use multiple pseudonymous biometric identities in 
biometric applications in the private sector, unless expressly forbidden. 
Effect 
The use of multiple identities based on the same biometric characteristics allows to avoid that the 
characteristics can be used as unique identifier, for example for linking information across various 
sources. The use of pseudonyms increases the privacy-enhancing effect. From a general, but also 
technical point of view, pseudonyms can not only be used for replacing a person’s name or identity 
(person pseudonym), but also for a role (for example, for a role as customer) (role pseudonym) or 
for a relationship (for example, for the relation with different communication partners) (relationship 
pseudonym). The use of multiple identities in combination with pseudonymity will enhance the 
privacy and security to the benefit of the data subjects. 
                                                     
36
 OECD, Directorate on Science, Technology and Industry, At a Crossroads : “Personhood” and Digital 
Identity in the Information Society, STI Working Paper 2007/7, 29 February 2008, pp. 44-45, available on 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/reports 
37
 See Section 3 a) German Federal Data Protection Act. 
38
 Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, WP 68, 29 January 2003, 
p.15., available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf   
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3.3.3 Best Practice N° 4: Revocability of biometric  identities and re-
issuance 
Biometric characteristics of a person are unique and persistent and can in principle not be changed 
in case of abuse. This given fact has always been one major concern for biometric IdM systems. 
New techniques however make it possible to issue various identities based on the same 
characteristics, which allow to revoke such identities. TURBINE has also developed and tested a 
mechanism to issue revocable biometric identities. The process of generating multiple independent 
protected identities from the same biometric characteristics is referred to as ‘diversification’. 
It is therefore recommended for biometric IdM systems, once the identity provider and the service 
provider are determined and their roles specified, that biometric identities are issued which are 
revocable.39 Furthermore, the IdM scheme should provide for the possibility to re-issue a protected 
biometric identity, in case a previously issued protected biometric identity would be compromised or 
lost (possibility to revoke).  
The revocation may also prove to be useful in case a biometric identity leads to too many failures, 
or if the relationship between the data subject and the identity provider is terminated. The 
revocation could be at the demand of the data subject or of the identity/service provider. A 
revocation policy shall be agreed upon and contain the specifications of the procedure. The 
revocation procedure and policy should be fully transparent for the data subject.  
Motivation 
Identity theft and identity fraud are realistic security threats for IdM systems in general. These 
threats have even more severe consequences if the impostors make use of the data of the data 
subject, which the data subject cannot change (such as finger tips, iris, etc). 
Various privacy advocates and some DPAs40 have therefore also pointed to this requirement of 
revocable biometric identities.  
Effect 
The use of revocable biometric identities is an important privacy-enhancing aspect of biometric IdM 
systems. As long as there are no mechanisms41 used to permit a data subject to revoke a biometric 
identity, the use of biometric data in an IdM system endangers the rights of data subjects whose 
characteristics have been (mis)used or stolen. The use of revocable biometric identifiers is 
essential for protecting the fundamental right to respect for privacy of the individuals upon the use 
of their unique human characteristics.  
If technology enabling the revocation of biometric identifiers is applied, the use of such technology 
will influence to an important degree the proportionality evaluation of the use of the biometric data. 
                                                     
39
 This has been researched for some years now and several methods for such ‘cancellable biometrics’ have 
been proposed. See, for example, N. Ratha, J. Connell, and R. Bolle, ‘Enhancing security and privacy in 
biometrics-based authentication systems’ IBM systems Journal, vol. 40, 2001, pp. 614-634.   
40 See, for example, A. Cavoukian, A. Stoianov and F. Carter, ‘Biometric Encryption: Technology for Strong 
Authentication, Security AND Privacy’ in E. de Leeuw, Fischer-Hübner, S., Tseng, J., Borking, J. (eds.), IFIP. 
Policies and Research in Identity Management; Boston, Springer, 2008, pp. 57–77. 
41
 For example, by the issuance of multiple biometric identifiers. 
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3.4 Best Practices for the enrolment for a biometric IdM 
system 
3.4.1  Best Practice N° 5: Credential and/or identi ty check   
It is of crucial importance that the control of the credentials or of the identity of the individuals who 
enrol in biometric IdM systems is thorough and reliable. Such check is especially important in case 
the biometric identity is used for authenticating the civil identity (e.g., in national biometric ID cards, 
for issuing biometric passports, travel documents or other identity documents, in welfare schemes). 
If the wrong person becomes enrolled, all later use of the biometric system is compromised. The 
security of biometric IdM system is hence only trustworthy as long as the credential or identity 
check is reliable.  
This check is not only important for IdM systems in the public sector42, but also for biometric IdM 
systems in the private sector for which the credentials or identity of the individuals before enrolment 
are important (e.g., biometric payment scheme). Therefore, the procedure(s) for such credential 
check or identification, and in particular which documents shall be submitted and the way such 
documents shall be provided (in original, copy, etc), shall be agreed between the identity providers 
and the service providers and shall be documented. Policies and contractual arrangements should 
be further in place to ensure that the personnel and agents of the identity provider(s) follow these 
procedures.  
For biometric IdM systems in which the identity is not relevant or necessary, but rather whether an 
individual is able to submit a credential in combination with a biometric identifier, the procedure(s) 
for linking the biometric identifiers with the credentials (for example, the evidence of age, the 
belonging to a particular profession, etc) shall be agreed and documented.  
Motivation 
A biometric IdM system which provides security at a given point is just a link in a security chain. 
Credentials or identity documents to be provided at enrolment are often less secured and therefore 
more likely to be subject to forgery and counterfeiting. Some clear agreements and procedures on 
these elements are therefore strongly advised in order to ensure the security aimed at with a 
biometric IdM system. The EDPS and some DPAs have pointed to this issue.  
Effect 
Biometric systems, which may involve risks for the rights of the data subjects, can only be effective 
if the procedure for enrolment has been carefully ‘designed’. Without appropriate procedures for the 
credential or identity checks to be made, the biometric system will not be effective and should not 
be implemented. 
3.4.2 Best Practice N° 6 : Deletion of the samples and of the original 
templates 
The conditions under which the local storage of biometric data enhances the privacy and data 
protection compliance of biometric applications include that (i) the original image of the biometric 
characteristic, (ii) all the forms of the image in between the extraction steps and (iii) the unprotected 
template shall not be stored but always deleted after the extraction process for enrolment or 
                                                     
42
 See, e.g., for the importance of this aspect for the issuance of biometric passports, EDPS, Opinion of 26 
March 2008 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation No 2252/2004, O.J. C 200, 6.08. 2008.  
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comparison. This should not only happen on the local device level (such as, e.g., on the biometric 
scanner or sensor) but also from all other components of the biometric system.  
The data subject could also be informed of this deletion (see also Best Practice N° 8).  
The protected templates should also be deleted if there is no need anymore for processing thereof 
in compliance with existing data protection requirements.43  
In case no protected templates would be used (see below), it is clear that at least the samples and 
all the forms of the image in between the extraction steps shall be deleted and that the local 
storage of the biometric template data is of crucial importance. 
Motivation 
EDPS and DPAs require in general that the controllers shall have a policy about the deletion of 
personal data after the processing. The term for which the data are kept is also often requested in 
notification forms. Such deletion strategy is even more important for biometric data processing. 
Only if the original images and templates, captured during the biometric process, are deleted, the 
possible misuse of the image or template, such as the use of possible sensitive information 
contained in the image or template or the use of the biometric data as a unique identifier can be 
prevented.  
Deletion of the data also prevents that they would be stored in a database, which permits to use the 
identification functionality. 
The deletion of the biometric data which is not needed for the processing is also required according 
to the data minimisation principle.  
Effect 
The deletion of the biometric data which are not needed enhances the privacy preserving effect in 
that the data can no longer be used for other purposes, including the use of additional information 
contained in the biometric data.  
                                                     
43
 See and compare, e.g., Biometrics Institute Privacy Code,  2006, section F.11.4.  
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3.5 Best Practices for the deployment of a biometric IdM 
system 
3.5.1 Best Practice N° 7: The use of privacy-enhanc ing technologies  
Transformation of the original biometric data 
Because of the various risks of the use of biometric samples and of templates (e.g., the possibility 
that they contain information about the data subject’s health44) it is best practice to transform the 
original biometric data (both biometric samples ànd the template) and to destroy the biometric 
samples ànd templates afterwards.  
The transformation of the original data should render it possible to delete the original biometric data 
after the creation of identifiers. This should be done during enrolment, and thereafter, for every later 
comparison process.  
The transformed information however will still refer to an identity of a given person - which is after 
all the goal of the use of the biometric IdM system - and the transformed information will hence still 
function as identifiers. For this reason, it is important that additional privacy-enhancing technologies 
are implemented in order to render these identifiers irreversible and unlinkable. 
Unlinkable biometric identities 
It is best practice that the digital representations of the biometric characteristics are processed with 
mathematical manipulations (encryption, etc.) with different parameters for every biometric product, 
system or service and specific techniques which guarantee low mutual information between 
templates derived from equal or very similar biometric data. This should avoid the combination of 
personal data of data subjects through the comparison of templates across databases and 
applications. The unlinkability also prevents that databases would be searched. These 
manipulations have as a result that the use of biometric data is limited to a specified context 
(context-specific use).45 
Irreversible biometric identities 
Captured biometric characteristics may include more information than what is needed for the 
comparison. Especially the biometric samples (previously referred to as the ‘raw biometric data’) 
may contain information which reveals racial or ethnic origin or data concerning health. The further 
processing of the data, especially of the biometric templates, limit the chances that such additional 
information is still contained therein. The transformation of the captured and processed information 
is therefore advised in transformed templates This requires however than it is not possible to 
reverse engineer the samples and the original templates from the transformed templates. 
                                                     
44
 M. Meints & M. Hansen, ‘Additional and in some cases health related information in biometrics’, in E. Kindt 
and L. Müller (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity management, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 2007, pp. 83-86. 
45
 See and compare also with the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of experts on data 
protection (CJ-DP), The introduction and use of personal identification numbers : the data protection issues, 
Council of Europe, 1991, pp. 15-17, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting 
/dataprotection/Reports/Pins_1991_en.pdf    
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The use of the fore-mentioned kinds of privacy-enhancing techniques is sometimes referred to as 
the deployment of ‘protected templates’.46 There are presently standardization efforts going on in 
the Joint Technical Committee 1 of ISO/IEC, Subcommittee 27, in relation with protected 
templates.47 The concept of ‘protected template’ of biometric characteristics refers essentially to the 
concept of protecting the biometric data and related identity by (1) the transformation and the 
generation of a secure reference to the biometric data by means of a robust one-way- function from 
which it is impossible to retrieve the original biometric information (transformation and 
irreversibility), (2) which reference does not permit cross matching between different databases 
(unlinkability), and (3) which is revocable and renewable (revocability). 
Motivation 
The concept of transformation of personal data is not established in the data protection legislation 
of most countries as such. The transformation of the original biometric data however has been 
suggested for a while.48 
A recommendation nor a requirement of unlinkability of personal data is in many data protection 
legislations set forth in explicit terms.49 General data protection legislation principles however 
require purpose specification and purpose binding for the collection and processing of personal 
data. It has been advocated to interprete these principles of purpose specification and finality, as 
an obligation to prepare personal data for context-specific usage. This could imply that it should be 
prevented that data could be linked for different purposes. Because of the increasing availability of 
biometric data over networks, it will become moreover increasingly difficult to enforce the purpose 
binding of personal data, unless technical measures are adopted. 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has stressed the technical possibility of linking data 
as a risk factor. It stated that it was necessary to scrutinize this from a data protection point of view, 
‘in particular concerning the technical possibility of sites sharing personal data of the user without 
his consent’. 50 In the context of biometric data processing, it furthermore expressed its concern that 
biometric data could be used as a unique identifier and recommended that the use of biometric 
data for linking should be avoided as much as possible. 51   
In very specific cases, (unprecedented) legislation (in Ontario, Canada) referred to the irreversibility 
and the requirement that encrypted biometric data cannot be used as a unique identifier, capable of 
facilitating linkages to other information, combined with deletion of the original information.52  
The unlinkability and irreversibility techniques shall be applied and could be recognized as ‘best 
available techniques’53 which render the use of biometric data more proportional with the risks for 
the data subjects.  
                                                     
46
 See J. Breebaart, C. Bush, J. Grave and E. Kindt, ‘A reference architecture for biometric template protection 
based on pseudo identities’, in A. Brömme (ed.), Proceedings of the Special Interest Group on Biometrics and 
Electronic Signatures, Bonn, Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2008, pp. 25-37.   
47
 See J. Breebaart, B. Yang, I. Buhan-Dulman, Ch. Busch, ‘Biometric Template Protection. The need for open 
standards’ in Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2009, pp. 299-304.  
48
 See also Cavoukian, A., Privacy and Biometrics, Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, 
1999, p 5, available at https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/files/cakoukian-paper.doc www.ipc.on.ca  
49
 The data protection legislation of only a few countries contain specific provisions relating to the linking of 
information, e.g., Slovenia.  
50
 See Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, WP 68, 29 January 
2003, p. 12. 
51
 Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics, WP 80, 1 August 2003, p.10.  
52
 In particular, in Ontario, Canada, the Social Assistance Reform Act of 1997 (later revoked) and the Ontario 
Works Act of 1997 (Article 75).  
53
 See also about the use of ‘best available techniques’ as one of the recommendations for privacy and data 
protection in the Union, ENISA Ad Hoc Working Group on Privacy & Technology, Technology-Induced 
challenges in Privacy & Data Protection in Europe, M. Langheinrich and M. Roussopoulos (eds.), October 
2008, pp. 9 and 35-36 available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_privacy 
_wg_report.pdf 
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Effect 
Because biometric data are fit for use as unique identifiers, the irreversibility and the unlinkability of 
biometric templates is privacy-enhancing and privacy-compliant if there is no legal basis with 
specific conditions or motivations for such linkability. 
Tuneable Trust 
In function of the application, different trust levels may be required. By varying the amount of 
biometric information exposed by each individual, the concept of tuneable trust allows to control 
better the uncertainty / reliability of a biometric system.  
Motivation  
A higher accuracy is usually achieved by increasing the amount of biometric information measured 
from a data subject. Data subjects are entitled and controllers are obliged to process accurate and 
adequate personal data.  
Effect 
Tuneable trust does not only allow to meet in an improved way the requirement to process accurate 
and adequate personal data, but also to minimize data because no excessive information is 
accessed if this information is not necessary. It allows to adapt the amount of biometric data 
requested from each data subject for meeting a required level of trust for an application.  
Anonymous verification  
While biometric characteristics enable in essence that an individual is identified or that his or her 
identity is verified, it is also possible to use biometric data without the identity of the data subject 
being revealed. If there is no need for identification or verification of the identity, semi-anonymous 
or fully anonymous access control mechanisms should be put in place to manage and to verify the 
authorization of a given person to an area or place. These could be combined with the use of 
biometric characteristics if the controller has a legitimate interest to deploy biometric data to 
enhance the security. 
Various scenarios and implementation methods exist. In some cases, it is sufficient that the service 
provider processes only biometric data to come to a decision, without any other identity or 
pseudonym details of the individuals concerned stored with the biometric data or separately (semi-
anonymous verification). In other cases, the service provider may verify whether the anonymous 
user who accesses the service or place belongs to a group of authorized data subjects, hereby 
using biometric characteristics data which remain under the control of the data subject (e.g., on a 
token) (fully anonymous verification). To the extent it can be avoided to process identity or 
pseudonym details in direct relation with the biometric data (semi-anonymous verification), and in 
the cases where it is sufficient to perform the verification on the level of a group while the biometric 
characteristics data remain under the full control of the data subject (fully anonymous verification), 
such design and technology is recommended in view of data minimisation and anonymization 
objectives and in order to avoid risks of further misuse of biometric data. 
Motivation 
The anonymous use of biometric data54 is in compliance with the data minimisation principle of 
Directive 95/46/EC. All data protection legislation of Member States require that no ‘excessive data’ 
shall be processed, while some legislations are very specific on this point.55 Some DPAs have 
                                                     
54
 This should not be confused with to what some refer to as ‘anonymous biometric data’. The latter is in our 
view strictly speaking a contradictio in terminis, since all biometric data refer and relate to an individual, 
whether directly identifiable or not. 
since all biometric data relates to an individual, whether directly identifiable or not. 
55
 The German Federal Data Protection Act, for example, explicitly states as a general principle that ‘data 
processing systems are to be designed and selected in accordance with the aim of collecting, processing or 
using no personal data or as little personal data as possible (…)’ (Section 3 a).   
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explicitly stated that anonymous group verification is preferred when using biometric data.56 This is 
also important in the evaluation of the proportionality of a system. 
Effect 
An anonymous biometric comparison system allows to use biometric characteristics for enabling an 
increased security while at the same time maintaining at the level of the service the anonymity or 
pseudonimity of the members of the group. Such anonymous verification system is demonstrated in 
TURBINE for access by pharmacists to an ehealth online forum, where anonymity is desirable, 
while at the same time assuring only access to pharmacists.  
3.5.2 Best Practice N° 8: Transparency and addition al information for 
the data subjects 
Because of the complexity of biometric systems, full transparency about the processing of the 
personal data, especially towards the data subjects, shall be endeavoured. 
This is especially the case when the informed consent is requested from data subjects for the 
legitimate processing of their personal data. Such consent can not validly be given if a system is 
not transparent. In case the controller relies on other legal grounds, transparency is equally a 
fundamental requirement. It results that the data subjects have to be informed of at least the most 
essential properties of the comparison system and the fall back procedures. In case the 
controller(s) rely on other bases for the legitimate processing, transparency is still needed.  
In addition to the legal information which shall be provided according to current data protection 
legislation57, it is for this reason recommended to inform the data subjects, of (i) the functioning of 
the system, in particular whether the verification or identification functionality is pursued and 
effectively deployed and where the biometric data are stored, (ii) the error rates of the particular 
system at the threshold set, and (iii) the procedure in case of failure of the system (fall back 
procedure) and in case of appeal by the data subject against the result of the comparison.58 The 
notice could also inform the data subject about the deletion of copies of the biometric 
characteristics and any specific security measures taken. It is also recommended to inform the data 
subject of the name and contact details of the identity provider and of the service provider.  
The additional information could take advantage of the possibility to be incorporated into a so-
called ‘multi-layered information notice’. Such notice essentially allows controllers to employ a 
simplified short notice in their user interface, as long as the latter is integrated in a multi-layered 
information structure, where more detailed information is available, and the total sum of the layers 
meets national requirements. There could be up to three layers of information: (i) the short notice, 
which provides the essential information (and, in view of the circumstances, any additional 
information necessary to ensure fair processing); (ii) the condensed notice, which includes all 
relevant information required under the Data Protection Directive; and (iii) the full notice, which 
                                                     
56
 CBPL, Advice N° 17/2008 of 9 April 2008 upon own initiative  relating to the processing of biometric data for 
the authentication of persons, n° 77 ; See and compare also with the Biometrics In stitute Privacy Code which 
promotes anonymity (Article 8). 
57
 The current information obligation includes inter alia the obligation to inform about the identity of the 
controller, the purposes, the recipients of the information and the access and correction right of the data 
subject as specified in the applicable national data protection legislation. 
58 See also CBPL, Advice N° 17/2008 of 9 April 2008 upon own initiative  relating to the processing of biometric 
data for the authentication of persons, n° 79. The need for transparancy and agreement on  FTE and FRR has 
also been recognized repeatedly in public sector applications, such as for the use of biometric passports. See, 
e.g., for the importance of this aspect for the issuance of biometric passports, EDPS, Opinion of 26 March 
2008 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation No 2252/2004, O.J. C 200, 6.08. 2008.  
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includes all national legal requirements and specificities. To increase the visual presentation of 
some of the information, the use of icons59, may also be considered. 
This Best Practice N°8 also includes that biometric  data shall not be collected from an individual 
without his or her knowledge. 
Motivation 
Under current data protection legislation, the consent by the data subject requires that the data 
subject has been informed about the system, that the data subject is able to choose freely whether 
to consent or not and that the consent is specific. In order to meet these conditions for consent, it is 
necessary that the data processing is transparent for data subjects in order to decide on whether 
they consent or not. Transparency, however, is also required if the data controller would rely on 
another legitimate interest for the fair and lawful processing of a system. 
Such transparency can be created by informing the data subject of several steps in the processing 
of their data in an biometric IdM system. This should be done, not only before the start of the 
processing, but preferably also during the processing itself.60 A multi-layered information notice was 
suggested by the Article 29 Working Party in an Opinion on harmonized information provisions in 
2004 and controllers in IdM systems could take advantage of the various methods therein 
proposed. 61 
Effect 
The increased transparency about the data processing will be beneficial for the specification of the 
purpose(s) of the biometric system. Information about the error rates, for example, will indicate how 
effective a given biometric data processing system may be for the purposes envisaged, for 
example for enhancing security or improving the efficiency (and fluency) of, for example, automated 
access, biometric payment methods, etc.   
The data subject will further be able, based upon the information received, to decide freely and in 
an informed way to participate in the system.   
3.5.3 Best Practice N° 9: Specification of fall bac k procedures and of 
the procedure to appeal a comparison decision 
The controller shall need to specify alternative procedures (‘fall back procedure’) in case the data 
subject cannot be enrolled (FTE), the biometric data cannot be acquired for further processing 
(FTA)62 and/or if the data subject does not consent with the biometric data processing. These 
alternative procedures can be different protocols (e.g., the use of other fingers in a fingerprint 
access control system), but can also be alternative access procedures (e.g., the use of non-
biometric access control means). A fall back procedure will also be required to control and review 
alleged false rejections (e.g., by determining the additional checks to be done by human 
intervention).  
                                                     
59
 See, for example, the suggestions made in this regard in the project PrimeLife. Other (standardization) work 
on icons for biometric systems is being done in ISO/IEC JTC 37 as well.  
60
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the Working Party on Police and Justice, The Future of 
Privacy. Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal framework for the 
fundamental right to protection of privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168, p. 20 : ‘Transparance : both developers 
and operators of IT systems have to ensure that the data subjects are sufficiently informed about the means of 
operation of the systems. Electronic access/information should be enabled’.  
61
 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 25 
November 2004.  
62
 Increasing the number of attempts may already address various failures in a simple way. However, this will 
affect the security provided by the system. Moreover, it may not always solve the issue and additional fall back 
procedures will remain required. 
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Such alternative procedure shall provide to the data subjects the same access rights, without 
significant delay and at no (extra) cost for the data subject. In general, one shall take care that such 
alternative procedures shall in no way result in any discriminatory treatment of the data subjects.  
Alternative procedures shall not only be determined in case of a specific individual failure affecting 
a particular data subject. Such procedures also need to be put in place for all data subjects in case 
of general failure of a biometric system due to a specific circumstances (e.g., failure of the whole 
biometric system due to hard- or software problem,…).  
In case a data subject is not allowed by the biometric system, for example to pass a specific 
entrance gate, it shall be determined how the data subject may appeal the decision.63 The appeal 
may involve the request for a further check by human intervention, but could also be a more formal 
procedure.   
Motivation 
Biometric systems use human characteristics, while considered universal and persistent, may vary 
from person to person which render biometric systems less accessible for some persons. Some 
persons will even not be able to enrol.   
The need to establish alternative procedures could be compare with the need for a back up solution 
of a failing IT system in general. This is a general security measure, also mentioned in international 
IT standards (see ISO/IEC 27000 standards) and therefore qualified as ‘good practice’. This ‘good 
practice’ is less straightforward from these standards in case of specific individual failure. The 
EDPS64 and the national DPAs have repeatedly stressed the need of fall back procedures for 
biometric systems.  
Effect 
Fallback procedures constitute essential safeguards for the introduction of biometric IdM systems 
because they are neither fully accessible for all persons nor completely accurate.  
At the same time, the fallback procedures shall not decrease the security level of the system nor 
stigmatize the individuals who are not able to provide their characteristics for processing. Fallback 
procedures shall effectuate that there is no discrimination between individuals in the request to 
provide biometric characteristics.   
3.6 Additional Best Practice N° 10: On the organization, the 
security and the certification of a biometric IdM system 
3.6.1 Organizational and technical security measures shall address the 
specific risks of biometric data processing 
In addition to the various design, enrolment and implementation best practices aspects which 
enhance the privacy and data protection rights of the data subjects, appropriate organizational 
measures are needed to back up these recommended practices. For example, in addition to the 
technology to revoke biometric identities, revocation schemes will have to be defined, organized 
and be set up for the revocation. In order to address the privacy concerns at the stage of the design 
of a biometric IdM system, it shall be organized that these concerns are discussed right from the 
start.  
                                                     
63
 Also note that in principle, automated individual decisions which produce legal effects or significantly affect 
the data subject and which are based on solely automated data processing are prohibited (Art. 15 (1) of the 
Directive 95/46/EC). 
64
 While the EDPS has stated this especially for large-scale implementations in the public sector, such as VIS, 
this is nevertheless also relevant for biometric systems in the private sector.  
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The organisational measures shall in principle address the various steps of a biometric system. For 
enrolment, sufficiently trained and qualified staff shall assist in this procedure.65 Clear agreements 
have to be made about the identity credentials that the data subject shall submit for the enrolment 
in the IdM system and any exemptions for enrolment, for example for children under a certain age 
or for elderly people. Access to any data in the system shall be restricted and reserved for duly 
authorized persons authenticated by one or multiple factors. A list of such persons has to be made 
and kept up-to-data. 
Furthermore, the biometric data processing controller shall assess, analyze and address the 
specific risks of each component of the biometric system. This includes risks associated with the 
support medium of the data (e.g., a smart card), the biometric sensor(s) and the communication 
links between the various components. General measures for protecting biometric data are not 
sufficient.66 The level of security needs to be appropriate to the risks presented by the biometric 
system. The controller shall hereby take the state of the art in account, as well as the cost of 
implementation of such state of the art measures.67 The general data protection legislation further 
mandates the data controllers to take the risks represented by the biometric processing and the 
specific nature of the biometric data into account. 
These risks shall be sufficiently defined, documented and appropriate security measures 
implemented. If, for example, the enrolment for a specific biometric IdM systems would require a 
thorough check of the identity and/or credentials, persons to perform these checks shall receive 
specific instructions and be trained.  Furthermore, the systematic (self) auditing of security 
measures is recommended. In case of breach of the security of the biometric data whereby 
biometric data is or could reasonably be believed acquired by an unauthorized entity, such security 
breach shall be notified by the controller to the authorities and to the data subjects concerned.  
If the controller relies on one or more processors, the controller shall choose a processor which 
provides sufficient guarantees that such measures shall be implemented and shall ensure the 
compliance with these measures. The controller shall therefore enter into a written or equivalent 
contract with the processor. 
Motivation 
The data protection legislation imposes upon the data controllers the obligation to implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against (i) accidental or 
unlawful destruction, (ii) accidental loss, (iii) alteration, (iv) unauthorized disclosure or access, in 
particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against (v) all 
other unlawful forms of processing.68 Some DPAs have issued guidelines for the controllers with 
more recommendations for the implementation of such measures, but these general guidelines do 
not sufficiently address the specific risks of biometric systems.69  
In opinions on the implementation of specific biometric systems, the EDPS and the DPAs have 
made these recommendations more specific in view of the risks of biometric data processing (e.g., 
the risks for re-use of data can be prevented by restricting access and monitoring such access).  
Effect 
Appropriate organizational and technical security measures are essential to protect the data 
subject’s privacy and data protection rights.  
                                                     
65
 See, e.g., the new Article 1 a introduced by Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 28 May 2009 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on biometric passports and 
travel documents. 
66
 See, e.g., ISO19092: 2008 for a concise overview of infrastructure requirements (see also Annex 1).  
67
 See also Art. 17 (1) § 2 of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
68
 See also Art. 17 (1) of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
69
 See, e.g., for Belgium, CBPL, Reference measures for the security for every processing of personal data, 4 
p., available at http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/static/pdf/ referenciemaatregelen-vs-01.pdf   
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The European Court of Human Rights has stressed in its case law that insufficient security 
measures may imply a breach of one’s right to privacy.70  
Data subjects, suffering damages as a result of unlawful processing, are entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller(s) of biometric IdM processing systems. 
3.6.2 Certification 
Because the technical operation and effects of biometric products and systems are difficult to 
evaluate by non-technical persons, such biometric products and systems should be reviewed by 
experts, both IT-experts and legal experts. The certification should address the security aspects 
ànd data protection aspects. The evaluation could be done in two steps, based on the functional 
and technical specifications of the system in the design phase, and continued upon the practical 
implementation of the system.71  
This would lead to the certification of the biometric products and systems relating to its privacy-
enhancing characteristics and privacy-compliance. This should be done in a certification program 
which takes also the privacy regulations (e.g., with regard to the requirement of information to be 
provided to the data subject and transparency) in a consistent way into account.72 Voluntary 
certification and self-certification of compliance could be the first steps towards such certification 
program. 
Motivation 
Various DPAs and the EDPS have stressed the opportunities that certification may offer.73 The 
ENISA Ad Hoc Working Group on Privacy & Technology also reiterated the benefits of certification 
in its report on ‘Technology-Induced challenges in Privacy & Data Protection in Europe’. 
Effect 
Best practices in combination with certification could render the sometimes complex legal 
regulations more clear for the stakeholders and the data subjects concerned. Clear information and 
communication about the issues covered by certification (and the issues not covered) are 
indispensable. The combination of best practices and certification could also facilitate the 
application of selected legal principles.  
                                                     
70
 ECHR, I. v. Finland, application 20511/03, 17 July 2008. 
71
 See and compare also with the Biometrics Institute Privacy Code which requires the auditing of biometric 
systems (Article 13).  
72
 An example of a European wide certification scheme which provides a privacy trust mark for end-users is 
EuroPriSe. EuroPriSe is based on European privacy standards, which are outlined in the EurPriSe Criteria. 
See EuroPriSe, EuroPriSe Criteria, v.1.0, available at https://www.european-
privacyseal.eu/criteria/EuroPriSe%20Criteria%20Catalogue%20 public%20version%201.0.pdf  The 
certification scheme, however, is not specific for biometric (IdM) systems. Certification and data protection 
compliance has also been regulated in Switzerland.  
73
 See, for example, the Independent Centre for Privacy Protection Schleswig-Holstein (ICCP/ULD), Germany, 
which leads the EuroPriSeconsortium. See also the CNIL, which joined the French governmental institute 
AFNOR, with the goal to be heard in domains such as biometrics (CNIL, 30 ans au service des libertés. 29e 
rapport d’activité, p. 52). 
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4. Conclusions 
The aforementioned TURBINE Best Practices suggested several guidelines which identity and 
service provider controllers of IdM systems should follow when implementing a biometric IdM 
system. The guidelines have been formulated in a limited number and in a concise way in order to 
allow the stakeholders to keep an overview of the most important privacy-enhancing requirements. 
They are based on one hand on previous work on the formulation of best practices for biometric 
data processing in other projects (e.g., BioVision) and on the other hand on TURBINE research 
and experience in relation with the implementation of the TURBINE technologies developed. Initial 
research ideas on best practices were also presented during the IFIP/PrimeLife summer school in 
2009 and were published. They have also been submitted, reviewed and discussed with the 
Advisory Board team to TURBINE. The TURBINE Best Practices do not address all issues in 
relation with biometric data processing (e.g., spoofing), but focus on the most essential ones.  
Privacy-enhancing technologies, such as for the irreversibility, the unlinkability and the revocation 
of biometric identities, and anonymous verification, developed and applied by TURBINE, have been 
given a clear role in these Best Practices. PETs have always been considered as necessary in 
preserving privacy of individuals in networks, and may play an important role in biometric 
systems.74 These technologies will further develop but the functionalities that they pursue may 
remain the same. 
The Best Practices require in addition a review of the compliance of a given biometric IdM system 
with the applicable national data protection legislation(s). Guidelines on the interpretation of the 
local data protection legislation with regard to the processing of biometric data for purposes of 
compliance have been issued by various DPAs now and compliance should be checked for each 
biometric IdM system, as well as special legal requirements for biometric data processing, such as, 
if needed, prior notification or authorization by the DPA. 
                                                     
74
 See EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
Promoting Data Protection by Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), COM(2007) 228 final, 10 p.; see also 
R. Hes, T. F. M. Hooghiemstra and J.J. Borking, At Face Value. On Biometrical Identification and Privacy, 
Achtergrond Studies en Verkenningen 15, The Hague, Registratiekamer, September 1999, 74 p.  
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 27 
5. Selected Bibliography 
Legislation and policy documents 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, O.J. L 281, 23.11.1995, pp. 31- 50 
Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics 
in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, O.J. L 142, 06.06.2009,  pp. 1 – 4. 
Ontario Works Act, 1997, Article 75, available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_97o25a_e.htm  
EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Promoting Data Protection by Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), COM(2007) 228 
final, 10 p. 
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, Standing Document 2 – Harmonized Biometric Vocabulary, version 12,  N 
3385, New York, ANSI, 16 September 2009, working draft text, 203 p.  
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, Text of Working Draft 24779- -2, Cross-jurisdictional and societal aspects of 
implementation of biometric technologies – Pictograms, icons and symbols for use with biometric 
systems - Part 2 : Fingerprint applications, N 3363, New York, ANSI, 25 August 2009, working draft 
text, 24 p.  
Opinions of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the EDPS and DPAs  
A. Türk, Declaration for the European personal data protection day, 28 January 2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_28_01_10_en.pdf 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions, WP 
100, 25 November 2004, 9 p., available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs 
/wpdocs/2004/ wp100_en.pdf 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics, WP 80, 1 August 
2003, 11 p. available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_ 
en.pdf  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, 
WP 68, 29 January 2003, 15 p., available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy 
/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the Working Party on Police and Justice, The Future 
of Privacy. Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal 
framework for the fundamental right to protection of privacy, WP 168, 28 p. 
Cavoukian, A., Privacy and Biometrics, Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, 
1999, 15 p., available at https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/files/cakoukian-paper.doc 
www.ipc.on.ca 
Cavoukian, A., Stoianov, A. and Carter, F., ‘Biometric Encryption: Technology for Strong 
Authentication, Security AND Privacy’ in E. de Leeuw, Fischer-Hübner, S., Tseng, J., Borking, J. 
(eds.), IFIP. Policies and Research in Identity Management; Boston, Springer, 2008, pp. 57–77.  
Cavoukian, A. and Stoianov, A., Biometric encryption : a positive-sum technology that achieves 
strong authentication, security and privacy, Privacy Commissioner Ontario, 2007, available at 
www.ipc.on.ca  
CBPL, Advice N° 17/2008 of 9 April 2008 upon own initiati ve relating to the processing of biometric 
data for the authentication of persons, 22 p.  
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 28 
CBPL, Reference measures for the security for every processing of personal data, 4 p., available at 
http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/static/pdf/referenciemaatregelen-vs-01.pdf   
CNIL, Communication de la CNIL relative à la mise en œuvre de dispositifs de reconnaissance par 
empreinte digitale avec stockage dans une base de données, 28 December 2007, 12 p.   
EDPS, Opinion of 26 March 2008 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Council Regulation No 2252/2004, O.J. C 200, 6.08. 2008.  
EDPS, Opinion of 19 October 2005 on three Proposals regarding the Second Generation 
Schengen Information Systems (SIS II) (COM (2005)230 final, COM (2005)236 final and 
COM(2005)237final, O.J. C 91, 19.04. 2006, pp. 38-56. 
EDPS, Opinion of 23 March 2005 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between 
Member States on short stay-visas COM(2004)835final, O.J. C 181, 23.07. 2005, pp. 13-29.   
Articles and reports  
Biermann, H., Bromba, M., Busch, C., Hornung, G., Meints, M.  and Quiring-Kock, G. (eds.) White 
Paper zum Datenschutz in der Biometrie, 2008, available at 
http://teletrust.de/fileadmin/files/ag6/Datenschutz-in-der-Biometrie-080521.pdf. 
Bogdanowicz, M., and L. Beslay, L., Cyber-security and the future of identity, IPTS report, 2002  
Breebaart, J., Yang, B., Buhan-Dulman, I., Busch, Ch. , ‘Biometric Template Protection. The need 
for open standards’ in Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2009, pp. 299-304.  
Breebaart, J., Bush, Ch.,  Grave, J. and Kindt, E.,  ‘A reference architecture for biometric template 
protection based on pseudo identities’, in A. Brömme (ed.), Proceedings of the Special Interest 
Group on Biometrics and Electronic Signatures, Bonn, Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2008, pp. 25-37.   
CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000, Paris, CNIL, 2001. 
Committee of experts on data protection (CJ-DP), The introduction and use of personal 
identification numbers : the data protection issues, Council of Europe, 1991, 20 p., available on 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Reports/Pins_1991_en.pdf 
Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to  
Automatic Processing of Personal Data [CETS No. 108] (T-PD), Progress report on the application 
of the principles of convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data, Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe, CM(2005)43, March 2005, 22 p., available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2005)43&Language=lanEnglish&Site=COE&BackColorInt
ernet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged  
Dinant, J.-M., ‘Chapter 5. The Concepts of Identity and Identifiability: Legal and Technical 
Deadlocks for Protecting Human Beings in the Information Society’, in S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De 
Hert, C. de Terwangne, S. Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection, Springer, 2009.  
ENISA Ad Hoc Working Group on Privacy & Technology, Technology-Induced challenges in 
Privacy & Data Protection in Europe, M. Langheinrich and M. Roussopoulos (eds.), October 2008, 
48 p. available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_privacy_wg_report.pdf 
European Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF), Final Report, December 2009, 324 p.  
Goldstein, J., Angeletti, R., Holzbach, M., Konrad, D., Snijder, M.,  Rotter, P., (eds.), Large-scale 
Biometrics Deployment in Europe : Identifying Challenges and Threats, JRC Scientific and 
Technical Reports, European Commission JRC – IPTS, Seville, 2008, 135 p.   
Grijpink, J., ‘Two barriers to realizing the benefits of biometrics : a chain perspective on biometrics, 
and identity fraud as biometrics’ real challenge’, Computer Law and Security Report  2005, pp. 138-
145 and pp. 249-256   
Hes, R., Hooghiemstra,T. and Borking, J., At Face Value. On Biometrical Identification and Privacy, 
Achtergrond Studies en Verkenningen 15, The Hague, Registratiekamer, September 1999, 74 p. 
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 29 
Kindt, E. and Müller, L. (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity management, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 2007, 
130 p., available at http://www.fidis.net   
Kindt, E. and Müller, L. (eds.), D13.4. The privacy legal framework for biometrics, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 
2009, 134 p., available at http://www.fidis.net      
Kindt, E., ‘The use of privacy enhancing technologies for biometric systems analysed from a legal 
perspective’ in M. Bezzi et al. (eds.), Privacy and Identity, IFIP International Federation for 
Information Processing AICT 320, 2010, pp. 134—145. 
Korte, U., Merkle, J., Niesing, M., ‘Datenschutzfreundliche Authentisierung mit Fingerabdrücken. 
Konzeption und Implementierung eines Template Protection Verfahrens – ein Erfahrungsbericht’, 
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2009, pp. 289 – 294. 
Legal-IST, Doc. No 11, Privacy-Identity Management, 4 November 2005. 
Meints, M. and Hansen, M., ‘Additional and in some cases health related information in biometrics’, 
in E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity management, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 2007, 
pp. 83-86. 
Müller, L., ‘Biometric system errors’, in E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity 
management, Frankfurt, FIDIS, 2007, pp. 26-36. 
OECD, Directorate on Science, Technology and Industry, At a Crossroads : “Personhood” and 
Digital Identity in the Information Society, STI Working Paper 2007/7, 29 February 2008, 51 p., 
available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/reports  
Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development, Biometric-based Technologies,   28 
April 2004, 66 p. 
Prime, Prime White paper, 2008, v.3.0, 19 p., available at https://www.prime-
project.eu/prime_products/white paper/PRIME-Whitepaper-V3.pdf 
Rossnagel, A., (ed.), Allgegenwärtige Identifizierung ? Neue Identitätsinfrastrukturen und ihre 
rechtliche Gestaltung, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006, 132 p.  
TURBINE, D.1.1.1, August 2008, 75 p. 
Van Kralingen, R., Prins, C. and Grijpink, J., ‘Het lichaam als sleutel’, National Programma 
Informatietechnologie en Recht, 8, Alphen aan den Rijn/Diegem, Samsom BedrijfsInformatie Bv, 
1997, 66 p.  
Previous best practices initiatives :  
Albrecht, A., BioVision. Privacy Best Practices in Deployment of Biometric Systems, BioVision, 28 
August 2003, 49 p., available at http://www.eubiometricsforum.com/ (last visited on 19 September 
2006) 
Biometrics Institute, Biometrics Institute Privacy Code, 19 July 2006, approved by the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner, available at http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/displaycommon.cfm?an= 
1&sub articlenbr=8 
BWG, Biometric System Security Evaluation and Certification – MS09, available at 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/policy_technologies/biometrics/ms09.shtml 
BWG, Use of Biometrics for Identification and Authentication. Advice on Product Selection. Issue 
2.0, 22 March 2002, 36 p. 
EuroPriSe, EuroPriSe Criteria, v.1.0, available at https://www.european-privacy-
seal.eu/criteria/EuroPriSe%20Criteria%20Catalogue%20 public%20version%201.0.pdf 
International Biometric Group, The BioPrivacy Application Impact Framework, 2001, available at 
http://www.bioprivacy.org/bioprivacy_main.htm  
Initiative on Privacy Standardization in Europe (IPSE), Initiative on Privacy Standardization in 
Europe, Final report, CEN/ISSS, 13 February 2002, 89 p., available at 
http://www.cen.eu/CENORM/Sectors/Sectors/ISSS/Activity/ipsefinalreportwebversion.pdf  
Practical guidelines for a privacy friendly implementation of fingerprint for identity verification ICT-2007-216339 
TURBINE-KUL-ICRI-D1 4 3-BEST_PRACTICES-R2 3 12/07/2011 
 
PU  ©TURBINE Consortium Page 30 
6. Annexes  
6.1 Annex 1: Concise overview of general infrastructure 
requirements to counter administration, infrastructure and 
biometric overtness vulnerabilities as set forth in 
ISO19092: 2008   
• Mechanisms to maintain the integrity of biometric data and authentication results between 
various components; 
• Mechanisms to mutually authenticate the source and destination of biometric data or 
authentication results; 
• Mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality of the biometric data between any two 
components; 
• Mechanisms to ensure an enroller has the proper permissions (access control for the 
enrolment function) to enrol the enrolee; 
• Mechanisms and procedures to ensure a binding of the biometric information to the 
enrolee, such that the biometric information captured during enrolment belongs to the 
enrolee; 
• Tamper-resistant comparison subsystems, or comparison subsystems in a physical 
environment that provides a high level of security; 
• Tamper-evident mechanisms that result in visual evidence that an attack has been 
attempted; 
• Tamper-responsive mechanisms that detect unauthorized access and initiate 
countermeasures, such as placing the system into a security state; and 
• Tamper resistant mechanisms that resist physical penetration.75 
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 Turbine, D1.1.1, August 2008, p. 30. 
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6.2 Annex 2: EDPS Opinion of 1 February 2011 on TURBINE  
As part of the TURBINE project, partners requested the opinion of the EDPS on the developments 
made in TURBINE. The request for opinion was filed on July 2010 as a milestone of the project. 
TURBINE partners received the opinion of the EDPS on 1 February 2011. The opinion is public and 
the text can be consulted on the website of the EDPS.76 The opinion will be published in the Official 
Journal as well. It is the very first time that the EDPS issues an opinion on a European research 
project. 
 
The EDPS analyzed several aspects of the project, including in particular the features of 
irreversibility and revocability of the biometric identification technology developed in TURBINE. The 
implementation of these two features contributes according to the EDPS significantly to privacy 
compliance by providing acceptable privacy compliant solutions.77 
 
The TURBINE Best Practices were also submitted to the EDPS for his opinion.  
The EDPS acknowledged the relevance of the Best Practices and stated that  
 
‘developing the best practices listed above will help to implement appropriate measures for 
any biometric Identity Management System conducted in compliance with the EU 
regulatory framework. Such a check list could indeed allow development of more privacy 
friendly systems, if they are taken into account from the start of projects’. 
 
With regard to the fallback procedures and the level of accuracy, the EDPS clarified that they have 
to be defined according to the precision of the system and monitored constantly in relation to the 
population using the system. The investment which needs to be made in the fallback procedures 
will be defined by the level of those rates. The EDPS stated that setting the precise level of 
accuracy expected from a biometric system is of great importance and recommended that this 
should be established early in the system and be integral part of the Best Practices as well.78 
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 EDPS, Opinion 1.02.2011 on a research project funded by the European Union under the 7th 
Framework Programme (FP 7) for Research and Technology Development (Turbine (TrUsted 
Revocable Biometric IdeNtitiEs), 14 p., also available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/ 
edps/cache/off/Consultation/OpinionsC/OC2011  (‘EDPS, Opinion on Turbine, 2011’) 
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 EDPS, Opinion on Turbine, 2011, §67 and §69. 
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 EDPS, Opinion on Turbine, 2011, §§ 34-37. 
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TURBINE partners agree with the recommendation of the EDPS.  
They suggest that the TURBINE Best Practices, which were developed during the project, are now 
amended in BP N° 9 with this precision by the EDPS which was however received after the end of 
the TURBINE project and therefore not taken into account before.  
 
BP N°9 of this document shall hence be entitled ‘Ac curacy, fall back procedure and appeal’ and 
shall be completed on p. 23 with the following paragraphs after respectively the third and fifth 
paragraph : 
“In addition, a precise level of accuracy expected from the biometric system shall be set 
early. Both the fallback procedures and the level of accuracy have to be defined according 
to the precision of the system and shall be monitored constantly during the operational use 
in relation to the population using the system.” 
 Motivation 
(…)  
“The setting of a precise level of accuracy is of great importance. Moreover, the investment 
which needs to be made in the fallback procedures will be defined by the level of those 
rates.”  
 
Furthermore, the overview of the TURBINE Best Practices will hence be as follows : 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the suggested Turbine Best Practices for a biometric IdM 
system, including the suggestion of the EDPS about accuracy in BP N° 9 
 
Furthermore, it may be noted that the EDPS commented that ‘the project, although not mentioning 
stricto sensu the level of accuracy among its list of best practices, has taken into account his 
aspect in the research, by setting precise accuracy goals at the beginning of the project. 
Furthermore, through the research, this level of accuracy has been tested, verified and even 
improved as to allow that for the use of a biometric sytem in an operational environment, such 
precise levels of accuracy will be adopted’.79  
                                                     
79
 EDPS, Opinion on Turbine, 2011, §36. 
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6.3 Annex 3: Application of the TURBINE Best Practices to 
use cases 
This Annex 3 demonstrates the application of the Best Practices developed above to two use 
cases. A first use case pertains to the use of biometric identifiers in an ehealth environment. The 
second use case demonstrates the Turbine Best Practices in the financial sector:  
At the same time, these use cases discuss nor identify all rights and obligations under the Directive 
95/46/EC as implemented in national law, while some may be mentioned however. It is therefore 
stressed that for each and every use case full respect shall be paid to existing national data 
protection legislation in addition to the application of the Best Practices set forth in this document.  
Expert advise may be required to assess risks and compliance for each use case.  
6.3.1.Turbine Best Practices in the ehealth sector 
Use of biometric pseudo-identities for protecting and securing access to 
information concerning health (medical data) 
Patients are entitled to the processing of information concerning their health with a a security level 
appropriate to the risks and the nature of the data. This requires that potential vulnerabilities are 
adequately handled. One of these vulnerabilities is access by unauthorized persons, both from 
within and from outside the organisation. to their health data, for example maintained in a 
centralized file or kept in a hospital. Article 17 (1) of the Directive 95/46/EC as implemented in 
national data protection legislation imposes a general obligation to implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures to protect health data. Security measures shall include access and 
logging control.80 State of the art and reduced costs for biometric applications may result in a 
decision to implement biometric security measures to protect access by health professonials to 
health related data and others with a need. Biometric enhanced access control even becomes 
more urgent with increasing obligations to notify breaches of personal data protection. While data 
controllers could hence invoke legitimate interests and a legitimate aim, data subjects are entitled 
to safeguards limiting or excluding interference with their privacy and data protection rights. In case 
consent would be asked, alternative measures in case of refusal are to be provided as such 
consent shall remain free. For this reason, a regulation confirming the (substantial) (public) interest 
in enhanced security for accessing medical data records of patients, could be preferred. 
To limit81 interference with fundamental rights of the data subjects, Turbine Best Practices 
recommend to use biometric technology to only verify the identity of the individual authorized to 
have access and to store the biometric pseudo-identity on a card82, kept under the control of the 
individual (BP N° 1 and 2). The biometric pseudo-id entity stored on the card allows to ensure that 
                                                     
80
 See ECtHR, I. v. Finland, no. 20511/03, 17 July 2008 where the European Court for Human Rights found a 
violation by Finland of the right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) of a nurse, whose medical data (for treatment of 
HIV and processed in the same hospital as where she was employed) were not sufficiently secured and kept 
confidential against unauthorized access by her colleagues ; see and compare also with U.S. federal privacy 
requirement in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its regulations 
which requires secure electronic access to patient’s medical records to maintain data integrity and 
confidentiality. 
81
 The safeguards proposed by the Turbine Best Practices are aimed at limiting interference as much as 
possible with the fundamental rights of the data subjects to privacy and data protection. Whether these 
safeguards recommended are sufficient to exclude any interference, will have to be determined by case to 
case. 
82
 E.g., a Health Professional Card. This card could be a multipurpose card (since cards are also commonly 
used for other purposes in this environment), provided the storage of the biometric pseudo-identity/ies is/are 
sufficiently secured. 
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the card holder is ‘valid’, i.e. that the person is entitled to hold and to use the card. The identity of 
that individual having access shall however previously have been properly identified before 
enrolment (for example, review of the credentials of a health practitioner, of employment with and 
function within the hospital for personnel, ….) (BP N° 5). Turbine Best Practices further require that  
the identity provider processes the original biometric samples captured from the data subject ànd 
the template in such way that the digital representations of the biometric characteristics in the 
pseudo-identities are irreversible and unlinkable, i.e. irreversible to the original sample and 
template, specific for this purpose of access control to medical data in this particular environment 
and organisation, allowing to destroy the biometric samples ànd templates afterwards. (BP N° 6 
and 7).  
The stored biometric pseudo-identity on the card should not be linkable with other (similar) activities 
of health practitioners for which a biometric pseudo-identity would be needed83, for example access 
to an online information forum reserved for particular professionals. Turbine Best Practices 
recommend hence that data subjects are entitled to multiple, unlinkable and irreversible biometric 
identities as pseudonyms (BP N° 3). These identitie s could be on the same card, and an 
appropriate user interface should allow the data subject to exercise control over the use of these 
identities. Such multiple identities also allow for adressing different levels of security and of 
authorization and access rights, while transactions cannot be linked.  
In case of loss or theft of the card, the biometric pseudo-identity shall be revocable. In addition to 
the technology used, such revocation procedure shall be set up, as well as other organisational 
measures for security and for fall back in case of need shall be organised (BP N° 9 and 10). The 
individuals authenticated by their biometric characteristics for access to health related information 
of others shall receive all appropriate information as set forth in BP N° 8, including information 
about the safeguards deployed and the error rates.  
Enhanced identity control of patients before treatment and for reimbursement 
Another scenario for the use of biometric identities is the secure identification (control) of patients 
before treatment, for example by radiotherapy84, as well to prevent impersonation in case of 
treatment for reimbursement of expenses by (private) health insurances. 
The interests of the controller to apply enhanced security measures by biometric comparison shall 
outweight the interests of the patients to privacy and data protection, however. This balance could 
be effectuated by limiting or excluding the risks upon the deployment of biometric identitifiers as 
much as possible by deploying appropriate safeguards which limit these risks. Turbine Best 
Practices contain such safeguards in ten principles, covering the need of the specification of the 
controller’s need (and the definition of the purposes), followed by the design, the enrolment and the 
actual deployment of the system. National data protection legislations, however, should be 
reviewed as well, as they may contain specific provisions on the rights of patients and social 
security. In case the government would become involved, for example for enrolling and issuing the 
biometric identities, legislation is needed stipulating the legitimate aims, the safeguards and 
motivating the necessity of the use of biometric data. 
The application of Turbine Best Practices implies that the identity of the individual listed for 
treatment or authorized for treatment with reimbursement is verified only, without the need for 
central storage, but local storage of the biometric pseudo-identity on a card85, kept under the 
control of the individual (BP N° 1 and 2). This req uires that appropriate procedures have been 
determined and followed by the identity provider (for example, a hospital, or practitioner of the art of 
                                                     
83
 For example, for issuing prescriptions or ordering medicines. In case of the need for enhanced secured 
access to particular online information, BP N° 7 reco mmends anonymous verification of the identity. This was 
also demonstrated in the Generic Demonstrator of Turbine. 
84
 See also and compare with the authorization of the French DPA for centralized storage of fingerprint for 
such purpose: CNIL, La biométrie entre à l’hôpital pour identifier des patients traités par radiothérapie, 
15.04.2010, available at http://www.cnil.fr/la-cnil/actu-cnil/article/article/la-biometrie-entre-a-lhopital-pour-
identifier-des-patients-traites-par-radio therapie-1/ 
85
 E.g., a (European) Health Insurance Card.  
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healing, ….) for properly identifying the patient (including medical coverage if applicable) before 
and during enrolment when the biometric pseudo-identities are issued (BP N° 5). The roles 
between the identity provider(s) and the service provider(s) shall be determined. Patients are 
according to the Turbine Best Practices entitled to the use of multiple biometric pseudo-identities, 
for example for treatment in different organisations, but also for different use, such as for health 
treatment  and administrative purposes (in particular for reviewing and securing the entitlement for 
health treatment in particular reimbursement schemes). These biometric pseudo-identities should 
be revocable in case of theft or misuse of the identity or of the card, by applying privacy-enhancing 
techniques. These techniques shall meet in addition to revocability, the objectives of unlinkability 
and irreversibility, as identified in the Turbine Best Practices (BP N° 4 and 7). Pseudo-identities 
could also be renewed each time a new medical consultation is given to a patient.  
Turbine Best Practices further require to delete the samples and unprotected templates after 
capture for every use (BP N° 6), which is also allo wed by using the recommended techniques. The 
patients shall receive all appropriate information as set forth in BP N° 8, including information abou t 
the safeguards deployed, place of storage, the error rates and of his or her right to appeal any 
decision of the biometric application. The controller shall deploy several other organisational 
measures for security and for determining and organizing fall back procedures in case of need (BP 
N° 9 and 10). 
6.3.2.Turbine Best Practices in the financial sector 
Another use case permitting to illustrate the application of the Turbine Best Practices is the 
deployment of biometric technologies for enhanced verification of the identity of banking customers, 
for example when using a payment card for a transaction whereby they instruct to debit their bank 
account, either at a point of sale or at an ATM for withdrawing money.  
Banking and affiliated organisations may have a legitimate interest in enhancing the security of the 
use of banking cards, for example in case of increased fraud, as evidenced by facts and reports, 
where the traditional use of banking card with PIN and additional security measures (other than the 
use of biometric data) proves to be no longer sufficiently reliable, and upon the conditions the use 
of biometric identifiers is assessed to be appropriate and the only means to enhance the security. 
This legitimate interest and aim of the controller(s) shall however respect the rights of the banking 
customers to privacy and data protection, by limiting or excluding risks associated with the use of 
biometric identifiers. Consent of the banking customers with the collection and the use of the 
biometric identifiers may play a role, if their choice is informed and free, but only to the extent 
customers have viable alternative measures (which shall not result in increased costs or 
discrimination between banking customers) in case they would not consent. In addition, and in 
order not to override the interests of the data subjects, appropriate safeguards shall be taken to 
exclude the risks for interference with the fundamental rights of the data subjects. These 
appropriate safeguards shall ensure that fundamental rights are not interfered with and may lead to 
so called user-controlled banking applications.  
Turbine Best Practices could guide the controllers in implementing such appropriate safeguards. In 
accordance with these Best Practices, banking customers are entitled to multiple, unlinkable and 
irreversible biometric identities as pseudonyms (BP N° 3). Such multiple biometric identities will 
enhance the privacy of customers when relying on several services of the banking organisation (for 
example, insurance services, banking services, investment services, …) without a need to link the 
use of these services by the same data subject. The irreversible pseudo-identities should 
guarantee that the biometric identities used cannot be reverse engineered to the original samples 
or template, and that the latter can be deleted. The pseudo-identities should further be issued only 
after a thorough identity check of the customer, which is often regulated by specific national 
legislation, requiring the proper identification in compliance with anti-money laundering legislation 
(BP N° 5). The pseudo-identities shall be used to verify (BP N° 1) the identity of the customer upon 
each use of the card issued and for accessing bank accounts or ATM, preventing the use of the 
same cards after skimming or shoulder surfing or theft of the card by thieves or impostors in 
combination with the PIN.  
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The architecture for such local verification of biometric identity, which shall preferably be reviewed 
and certified, should come in addition to existing authentication structures for pin verification value 
of card users in the banking sector, which shall remain in place as fall back or alternative measure 
in case the customer do not consent (BP N° 9 and 10 ). The banking customer should with an easy 
interface have full control over the use of his or her biometric pseudo-identities for banking 
services, including for selecting a biometric pseudo-identity, allowing for anonymous but secure 
verification of membership of a loyalty program of the customer for taking up membership services 
to which he or she is personally entitled to (BP N° 2 and 7). It is for these last services not 
necessary to verify the identity of the customer, but only whether he or she is member of the group. 
The level of trust for this particular use could also be adapted (i.e., lowered) (BP N° 7).   
The banking customer should receive full and transparant information about the functioning of the 
use of the biometric pseudonymous identifiers, including about the (risks of) FRR (i.e., this should 
be reasonably low in view of the usuability of the services) and FAR (i.e. acceptance of impostors). 
This information should also be provided when interacting with the system, for example in multi-
layered information notices (BP N° 8). In case the customer is no longer with the same banking 
organisation, the biometric identities shall be revoked and all personal data properly deleted, for 
which the controllers shall set up an appropriate procedure. More importantly, such revocation, 
including renewability and re-issuance of the biometric pseudo identities, should be possible in 
case of theft or misuse of the biometric data (BP N° 4 and 6).  
 
 
 
Finally, we hereby also like to refer to the proposed GlobalPlatform based architecture for multiple 
service providers as developed in Turbine public deliverable 1.2.1.86 This architecture explaines the 
storage of several pseudonymous identifiers (Turbine’s ‘pseudo-identities’) on one token, for use by 
several service providers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
86
 KUL, D.1.2.1. Services and schemes for multiple trusted identity, Turbine, February 2008, pp. 33-
34, available at http://turbine-project.org/dowloads/TURBINE-KUL-D121-General_Scheme-
R1.0.pdf 
